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Abstract
Joseph Raz has argued that the problem of the amoralist is misconceived. In this paper, I
present three interpretations of what his argument is. None of these interpretations yields
an argument that we are in a position to accept.
1 Introduction
The problem of the amoralist is the problem of providing a person who is not moral with a rea-
son to be moral. In his paper ‘The Amoralist’, Joseph Raz concerns himself with this problem,
but he does not attempt to solve it. Rather the problem itself is his target (1999: 273-4). Raz
implies that what is called the problem of the amoralist is not a genuine philosophical problem.
He describes the problem as misconceived, as involving an illusory distinction and as arising
from a false assumption. This paper offers three different interpretations of Raz’s argument
against the supposed problem being an actual problem. The argument is objectionable on all of
these interpretations. Before introducing any of the interpretations, it will be useful to state
Raz’s conception of the problem.
An amoralist is a person who is not moral. They are without morality. Someone can
be an amoralist while not even understanding what it is to be moral. Someone might also
understand but see no reason to be moral, or so it seems at first blush. ‘Why should I be
moral?’ this amoralist asks. The problem of the amoralist, as Raz conceives it, would be solved
if we can give a good argument for being moral to the amoralist who poses this question.
Raz’s conception of the problem also includes a proposition about what the significance
would be of there not being any good argument. Morality would not be rationally defensible –
would not be rational, for short:
If one can be an amoralist then the validity of morality is undermined unless one
can be amoral only because of ignorance or irrationality. Morality, the underlying
thought is, is rationally defensible only if it can marshal arguments in its support
which an amoralist must rationally accept. (1999: 273)
This quotation gives some inkling of what it is for morality to be rational. Raz adopts a
provisional criterion for when a person has morality that enables a clarification of this matter.
On this criterion, to be moral is to believe that each person is valuable in themselves, simply in
virtue of being a person. For morality to be rational is for there to be a good argument for
the truth of this belief (1999: 276). We will consider a proposal for the requirements that an
argument must meet in order to be good later in this paper.
Raz’s provisional criterion is questionable. Can one be a moral person just by having a
belief? Does not having this quality also involve being disposed to act in certain ways? Towards
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the end of ‘The Amoralist’, Raz himself subjects his provisional criterion to scrutiny and finds
it wanting (1999: 299-301). It was introduced so that he could proceed with evaluating the
problem of the amoralist with a greater degree of precision than if nothing had been said about
what it is to have morality. Raz reassures us that what he has to say can be adapted for other
understandings (1999: 274).
2 An Interpretation of Raz’s Argument
In this section, I will present an interpretation of Raz’s argument based on some of the state-
ments he makes regarding how to interpret it. One of these statements also concerns another
argument: an argument for why the rationality of morality depends on being able to provide
an amoralist with a reason for being moral. After introducing this other argument, Raz tells
us that he will attack a fundamental presupposition of it:
True, this argument is too simple. It disguises many ambiguities, and it begs many
questions. I will not, however, try to challenge it directly. Rather I will undermine
its most fundamental presupposition. It sees morality as a separate domain. The
amoralist stands outside it and refuses to go in. (1999: 276)
Raz thinks of the presupposition that he identifies as fundamental because it is impossible for
there to be an amoralist unless the presupposition is true and the problem of the amoralist
depends on this possibility in order to be a problem at all. He will therefore attack the problem
by attacking the presupposition.
We can reconstruct Raz’s argument as three premises and two inferences from these
premises:
(1) The problem of the amoralist is only a genuine philosophical problem if it is possible for
there to be an amoralist.
(2) A necessary condition for the possibility of an amoralist is that morality is a separate
domain.
(3) Morality is not a separate domain.
From (2) and (3):
(4) It is impossible for there to be an amoralist.
From (1) and (4):
(5) The problem of the amoralist is not a genuine philosophical problem.
I have formulated this argument without clarifying what it means for morality to be a separate
domain. I have also not explained Raz’s grounds for denying that morality is a separate domain.
These two tasks will occupy the rest of this section.
Raz describes the amoralist as standing outside of morality. This is a metaphorical descrip-
tion because morality is not a region of space or a physical entity that occupies a region of
space, outside of which the amoralist stands. Raz’s articulation of the presupposition that he
attacks is also metaphorical: morality is a separate domain. If one thinks of the amoralist as
standing outside of morality, then it seems that an attack on this presupposition will remove
the possibility of an amoralist. But this will only be the case if the presupposition, when under-
stood in less metaphorical terms, still captures a necessary condition for the possibility of an
amoralist. I do not think that Raz’s understanding of it fulfils this requirement. This objection
will be made in the next section. At this point, I will present his understanding.
For morality to be a separate domain, on Raz’s understanding, is for there to be moral
interests and for there to be other practical interests, all of which are not only something other
than moral interests but can also be pursued without being moral. Raz does not spell out that
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this is his understanding, but it is suggested by the fact that much of his essay is spent arguing
that there is a practical interest which, though not itself a moral interest, cannot be pursued
without having morality. The closest Raz comes to spelling out his understanding is in the
following passage, in which he compares his provisional criterion for having morality with an
alternative criterion, according to which to have morality is to engage in a distinctively moral
form of reasoning:
What is common to the view that the mark of morality is acceptance of the princi-
ple that people are of value in themselves and to the suggestion that it is marked by
the deployment of a special method of argument is a conception of morality as an
autonomous area, distinct from other practical concerns. This assumption, seen
in operation in Nagel’s argument, and essential to all contractarian approaches to
morality, though not only to them, explains how the amoralist is possible: he is
someone standing outside morality and denying that there is a route, a rationally
compelling route, which could lead him in. (1999: 302)
The word ‘practical’ is being used here in a very broad sense, in which it contrasts with the-
oretical and aesthetic. When Raz criticizes others for assuming that morality is distinct from
other practical concerns, he means something more than that these others are assuming that
there are practical interests that are not moral interests. He means that they are assuming that
all of these practical interests also do not require having morality in order to be pursued.
Having considered Raz’s understanding of what it is for morality to be a separate domain,
let us turn now to what Raz has to say against it having this quality, in other words his
justification for (3). Raz focuses on the interest of friendship. We can divide what Raz has
to say about friendship into two parts. First, there is his reason for thinking that friendship
is not a moral interest. Second, there is his reason for thinking that friendship nevertheless
requires morality in order to be pursued. Regarding the first part, Raz is very brief. He tells us:
Volunteering to work for Oxfam in one’s spare time may be good for one because
it is a morally good thing to do. But there is nothing specifically morally good
about having friends. People bereft of friends may have a lonely and impoverished
life, but they are not morally at fault. (1999: 295)
Raz talks about having friends in this quotation, but when he considers why friendship requires
morality, he focuses on being a friend (1999: 285). I believe his thinking is best formulated
throughout in terms of being friends. Adapting what is said in the quotation, his view might
be that there is nothing morally good about being a friend, so being a friend is not a moral
interest. Alternatively, it might be that a person who decides not to be friends with anyone
cannot be morally faulted purely because of this decision, so being a friend is not a moral
interest. Raz’s reason for saying that being a friend is not a moral interest is less than fully
clear. I will not dwell on this issue, however, as it is does not matter greatly within this paper.
Raz has much more to say on why being a friend, even if it does not count as a moral
interest itself, nevertheless requires some sort of morality. Raz claims that to be a friend to
another one must have concern for the well-being of the other, independently of what one
can gain from their well-being, and that to have this is to treat the other as having value in
themselves (1999: 287). Raz seems to associate this treatment with believing that the other has
value in themselves, such that there cannot be this way of treating the other without the belief.
He considers various objections from hypothetical amoralists to the claim that being a friend
therefore involves having morality. I will present two of these objections. Firstly, could not
someone be friends with another yet value them purely as a person who brings certain good
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things into their life, without regarding the other as having value in themselves? Raz denies
that this is possible:
The more extreme amoralist. . . may say that he cares about his friend, treats him
as a person of value, only when doing so serves his own interests in the friendship.
This amoralist simply is not a friend to this other person. (1999: 288)
Another objection that Raz considers, from a more moderate amoralist, is that one can believe
that one’s friends have value in themselves without believing that each person has value in
themselves. One can believe that one’s friends have some quality which not everyone has –
that they are all artists, for instance – and that it is this quality which gives them value in
themselves. By Raz’s provisional criterion for having morality, one can therefore be a friend
without being moral. To counter this objection, Raz turns against his provisional criterion and
subjects it to criticism. He says that we do not have sufficient grounds for judging that the
supposed amoralist who values their friends in themselves because of some less-than-universal
quality is actually outside of morality:
The failure to identify a position which marks the moralist off from the (re-
formed) amoralist was a failure to find a way of reading ‘people have value in
themselves’ which renders it both true and appropriate to be the mark of moral-
ity. (1999: 301)
I will pass over the readings that Raz considers of the claim that people have value in themselves,
because there is an obvious objection to his argument, as interpreted in this section.
3 An Objection to the Argument
The argument ascribed to Raz in the previous section requires that we understand what it
is for morality to be a separate domain in such a way that its being a separate domain is
a necessary condition for the possibility of an amoralist. Otherwise (2) will be false. But
Raz’s understanding does not appear to fulfil this requirement. On that understanding, for
morality to be a separate domain is for there to be moral interests and for there to be other
practical interests, all of which are not only something other than moral interests but can also
be pursued without being moral. However, if that is our understanding, then just one instance
of a practical interest which is not a moral interest, yet cannot be pursued without having
morality, would mean that morality is not a separate domain. However, in the case of a single
exception, it seems that there could be an amoralist still. They would not be able to pursue that
practical interest, but they would be able to pursue other practical interests. Even if there are
many practical interests that presuppose morality, so long as a person does not need to pursue a
morality-presupposing interest in order to live at all, there can be an amoralist.
Part of the difficulty with evaluating Raz’s understanding of what it is for morality to be
a separate domain is that the concept of a practical interest, or ‘practical concern’, to use his
term, has not been sufficiently clarified. Raz does not clarify it in his paper. I am not sure how
to clarify it myself, beyond giving examples of practical interests, such as maintaining one’s
health and having a fulfilling working life. What we can say is that there needs to be a response
to the concern articulated in the previous paragraph, or else we cannot accept premise (2) of
the argument. In fact, in the absence of a response, we ought to reject it, because the concern
looks as if it will survive any plausible clarification of what a practical interest is.
4 A Second Interpretation and an Objection
There are ways of interpreting Raz’s argument which render it immune to the objection in
the previous section. A second interpretation begins with the observation that Raz, at certain
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points in his paper, does not sound as if he is denying that there can be amoralists at all. Rather
he sounds as if he is denying that there can be amoralists who are relevant to the problem of
the amoralist. To be relevant to the problem of the amoralist, as Raz conceives it, a possible
amoralist must have qualities which enable them to challenge the rationality of morality. Raz
denies that all possible amoralists have these qualities:
With Williams we can leave on one side the amoralist who has no concern for
people, no friendships, no people he likes or is fond of, and who has no desire for
such feelings, attitudes, and relationships. . . [His] life is so severely limited that—
for reasons similar to those explained above concerning the person who denies any
values—he poses no challenge to morality. The challenge is posed by an amoralist
who can have a rich and rewarding life, while denying the value of people. Such
an amoralist is like us in valuing friendship and companionship. (1999: 283)
On Raz’s conception of the problem of the amoralist, it includes the proposition that if there is
no satisfactory answer we can give to the amoralist who asks, ‘Why should I be moral?’ then
morality is not rational. But in light of this proposition, the problem entails that there can
be an amoralist whose life is not severely limited, or so Raz maintains. For only this kind of
amoralist, he thinks, can challenge the rationality of morality.
In the quotation above, Raz suggests that if amorality cannot be combined with being a
friend, then the amoralist’s life is too severely limited to challenge the rationality of morality.
For this view to have any plausibility, then being a friend has to cover other close relationship
roles. In line with this point, Raz says that he is counting other close personal relationships
as friendships (1999: fn. 22). With this expanded usage in place, we arrive at a second inter-
pretation of his argument:
(1) The problem of the amoralist is only a genuine philosophical problem if it is possible for
there to be an amoralist who challenges the rationality of morality.
(2) A necessary condition for the possibility of such an amoralist is that there can be an
amoral life which is not severely limited.
(3) An amoral life must be severely limited.
From (2) and (3):
(4) It is impossible for there to be an amoralist who challenges the rationality of morality.
From (1) and (4):
(5) The problem of the amoralist is not a genuine philosophical problem.
The third premise of this argument is supported by the following sub-argument: if being an
amoralist cannot be combined with being a friend, then an amoral life must be severely limited;
being an amoralist cannot be combined with being a friend; therefore an amoral life must be
severely limited. In the rest of this section, I shall object to the significance attached to being
friends, on this interpretation of the argument.
There is a conception of what it is for morality to be rational according to which the fact
that amorality cannot be combined with being a friend is irrelevant. On Raz’s provisional
criterion, having morality is a matter of having a certain belief: the belief that each person
is of value in themselves, in virtue of being a person. One might think then that, since the
belief that defines morality is not self-evident, for morality to be rational is for there to be a
good argument for this belief. A good argument, one might further think, is an argument for
the truth of this belief which is sound, which does not require having the belief in order to
be understood and which cannot be reasonably objected to, whatever one’s stance towards the
belief is. If that is the case, then the rationality of morality depends on being able to provide
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a good argument to the amoralist who asks, ‘Why should I be moral?’ But if we accept this
line of thought, then the fact that being an amoralist cannot be combined with being a friend,
supposing it is a fact, is irrelevant for setting aside the problem of the amoralist. We can still
proceed along the same line of thought for answering the question.
It is precisely this line of thought which Raz considers as grounding the philosophical need
to answer the amoralist:
If one can be an amoralist then the validity of morality is undermined unless one
can be amoral only through ignorance or irrationality. Why should one think
so? The simple argument runs somewhat as follows. If morality is valid, that
is, if people are valuable in themselves, then it is possible for people to come to
know that. Moreover, it is possible for people who are amoral to realize that there
are rationally compelling reasons to accept that people are valuable in themselves.
(1999: 276)
If this is why the amoralist poses a challenge to the rationality of morality, it is altogether
unclear why there would no longer be this challenge should being a friend presuppose morality.
Raz questions the line of thought just quoted by questioning whether having morality consists
in having the belief that people are valuable in themselves. But his questioning does not help
overcome the objection that it is irrelevant whether or not the amoralist can have friends. He
implies that to be moral is to believe, not that each person is of value in themselves, rather that
each person potentially has this value (1999: 300). We can adapt the conception of morality
being rational presented in the previous paragraph to cope with this position. For morality
to be rational is for there to be a good argument, addressed to the amoralist as well, for the
truth of this belief. The challenge to provide an argument thus remains whether or not the
amoralist can have friends.
5 A Third Interpretation and Objections
Raz thinks that if an amoral life must be severely limited, then the amoralist cannot challenge
the rationality of morality. The third interpretation of Raz’s argument attributes the same
main argument to him as the previous interpretation, but differs from it over the sub-argument
for the third premise: that an amoral life must be severely limited. It does not say that the
incompatibility between amorality and being a friend is enough, on its own, to entail that an
amoral life is limited to this extent. Raz, however, suggests that the points he makes about
friendship can be adapted for other things (1999: 283-284). There are many other potential
aspects of one’s life which can only be accessed by having morality. They too presuppose
morality. It is in light of this fact, according to the argument on the third interpretation, that
the only possible amoralist is one whose life is too severely limited to challenge the rationality
of morality. Hence the problem of the amoralist is not a genuine problem.
Raz indicates that his argument is not to be understood as appealing exclusively to the
amoralist’s lack of the opportunity to be friends in the following passage:
By examining the amoralist who has at his disposal the full range of goods by
which his life can be enriched, and investigating the evaluative presuppositions of
these goods we can—I will argue—demonstrate that there is no gulf between the
moralist and the amoralist, and we can do so more securely and in a more far-
reaching way than if we disregard these value-presuppositions in trying to extend
the amoralist’s sympathies and motivations. (1999: 284)
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Raz’s thought here is that if we try to conceive of an amoralist who has the opportunity to
choose various potentially rewarding options in their life, while remaining amoral, our con-
ception is incoherent because all or virtually all of these options presuppose having morality.
The only possible amoralist is one whose life is too severely limited to challenge the rationality
of morality, while the closest thing to an amoralist whose life is not that severely limited is a
person within the horizon of morality. Raz puts his conclusion, somewhat obscurely, in terms
of there being no gulf between the moralist and the amoralist. What he means is that only an
amoralist whose life is not that severely limited is relevant to the problem of the amoralist, but
a person with such a life is actually within morality.
Since Raz writes primarily about the relationship between having morality and being
friends, in order for the argument on the third interpretation to work, we need to be able
to apply his points about friendship to other potential aspects of a person’s life. The result of
this application needs to be that the only possible amoralist is one whose life is too severely
limited to be relevant to the problem of the amoralist. I do not think that we can apply Raz’s
points about friendship to yield this result. When arguing that being a friend presupposes
morality, because it requires concern for the well-being of one’s friend independent of one’s
own gain, Raz sets aside something that might appear to be friendship but is actually some-
thing else. The person whose behaviour is superficially friend-like is nevertheless not a friend if
they do not have unselfish concern for the well-being of the other. The setting aside of this
person as not a true friend was noted earlier in this paper. It fits with how people talk. For
instance, someone in a difficult situation may find that certain people, whom they previously
regarded as friends, suddenly keep their distance, despite not being in any great danger. They
might react by saying, ‘These people were not really my friends.’ Raz implies that to be a
friend to the person would be to show concern for that person’s well-being, in a way that is
not calculated for one’s own gain, and this implication seems to capture the thinking behind
the reaction. Somewhat confusingly, he refers to the relationship which these people had with
the person in difficulty as limited friendship (1999: 288). A more appropriate term, granting
Raz’s outlook, is pseudo-friendship. They are pseudo-friends with the person. (The question
of whether this person was only pseudo-friends in return need not detain us.) Now being a
pseudo-friend does not presuppose morality and so can be pursued by the amoralist. So al-
though the amoralist misses out on being a friend, there is something that resembles it which is
available to them. This leads to a worry about Raz’s effort to establish that the amoralist’s life
is severely limited.
Raz’s main example of something that presupposes morality is being a friend, but he thinks
we can apply his point about this to other things. However, since with this example, there is
something that resembles the morality-presupposing good which is available to the amoralist,
we are left with the thought that the same will be true of other things that presuppose morality.
For each potential aspect of a person’s life that presupposes morality, or many of them, there
will be something that resembles it which does not carry this presupposition and which is
therefore available to the amoralist. For example, if philosophy presupposes morality, the
amoralist cannot be a philosopher but they can be something resembling it, namely a sophist
(Nussbaum 1985: 129-131; Nussbaum 1999: II). And so, while it may be that the amoralist’s life
strikes us as worse because of what cannot be accessed, we will not be able to dismiss this figure
as having a life that is too severely limited to be of relevance to the problem of the amoralist,
owing to such options being available to them. This is the worry.
Raz does not clarify the notion of a severely limited life. But at least one kind of amoral life
that he describes obviously deserves to be thought of as severely limited:
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The amoralist does not believe in morality, either because he doubts its validity,
or because he is not aware of it, or does not comprehend it. This does not mean,
of course, that he does not believe in any values, in anything being valuable. That
would reduce the amoralist to the level of an animal able to pursue its bodily
imperatives only, a creature driven by hunger for food or sex, by the need to
discharge bodily functions, and to protect itself from extremes of heat or cold.
Such creatures pose no challenge to moral philosophy. (1999: 274)
According to Raz, the role that value beliefs play in action entails that one must believe that
some things are valuable in order to lead a life that goes beyond the pursuit of bodily impera-
tives. An amoralist who does not believe this, and therefore only has these imperatives to guide
them, obviously leads a severely limited life. Raz thinks that any person outside morality also
leads a life that is too severely limited for them to challenge the rationality of morality, even if
they do have some value beliefs. But the amoralist conceived above does not have a life that
is so obviously severely limited. I think it is as close to the life which Raz describes as rich
and rewarding as it is to the severely limited life he presents in this quotation. Furthermore,
merely asserting that most other goods are like friendship in what they presuppose should not
convince us that an amoral life is without its distinctive rewards. We cannot simply assume,
as Raz invites us to, that there are no valuable life options that in turn presuppose amorality.
So far I have cast doubt on Raz’s argument that the amoralist’s life is too severely limited
to challenge the rationality of morality by casting doubt on his claim that an amoral life must
be severely limited. Raz does not do enough to secure this claim. In any case, one can grant
the claim yet still object to Raz’s argument on the third interpretation. The objection that
was made in the previous section can be adapted for it. I imagine an amoralist articulating the
objection like so: “To be moral is to believe that each person is valuable in themselves, in virtue
of being a person. For morality to be rational, in the sense in which I am interested, there needs
to be an argument that establishes the truth of this belief and this argument must be addressed
not just to people with the belief but also to someone like me. Perhaps not holding this belief
means that my life is severely limited. But that does not entitle you to dismiss the challenge
I have set: either provide a good argument to me for the belief that defines morality or concede
that morality is not rationally defensible. The only way to dismiss the challenge is to show that
my criterion for morality being rational is mistaken and there is no reason to think that you
can show this just by arguing that my life must be severely limited.” Raz does not respond to
the amoralist who thinks in this way, despite initially motivating the problem of the amoralist
by appealing to their criterion of rationality. Without a response, his argument on the third
interpretation also does not work.
6 Solving Versus Dissolving the Problem
It is tempting to ignore Raz’s criticism of the problem of the amoralist and simply treat the
material in his paper as an effort to solve the problem. The only other evaluation of his paper
that I have encountered adopts this approach (Pedersen 2006: 59-60). According to it, Raz tries
to provide the amoralist with a reason to be moral by saying that it is in their interests, so
that they can enrich their lives with goods that presuppose morality. But, whatever the merits
of this way of treating the material in his paper, Raz himself is opposed to it. Apart from
insisting that the problem of the amoralist is his target, he also objects to this way of solving
the problem.
The objection is made while operating with his provisional criterion for having morality.
But Raz gives no sign of losing his investment in the objection when he subjects that criterion
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to criticism, and it can be varied to fit with his final position. The objection is that establishing
that it is in the interests of the amoralist to be moral may not establish that the belief which
defines morality is true, when this is what needs to be shown:
Some may try to show that since amoralists have to give up many goods which it
is in their own interest to pursue, they can be true to their beliefs only at the cost
of harming their self-interest. Perhaps it can even be shown that because of this
anyone has a self-interested reason to believe in the value of people, though this
step falls foul of my objection to Nagel. It does not prove the amoralist wrong.
(1999: 282)
When the problem of the amoralist is clarified using Raz’s provisional criterion, there is a kind
of amoralist who regards the belief that defines morality as false. To provide that amoralist
with a reason to be moral, one must argue that the belief is true, not or not merely that the
amoralist’s life will be worse off in the absence of the belief, otherwise one has failed to engage
with their position (1999: 278).
Given what Raz says about appeals to self-interest, his effort to establish that the genuine
amoralist must have a severely limited life, that anyone with a rich and rewarding life is actually
within morality, is puzzling. For what difference does establishing this make? The principal
value of establishing this point appears to be that it gives the amoralist a self-interested reason
to be moral. It may be proposed that if the limitations of a life without morality are extreme
enough, one cannot be an amoralist without having a severe mental disorder; then there would
be no obligation to ensure that an argument for being moral is accessible to the amoralist. Raz
does not explicitly say that this is his strategy against the problem of the amoralist, and what he
does say is not sufficient for him to adopt this strategy. Certainly, there is a case to be made that
an amoralist who can only pursue bodily imperatives is subject to a severe mental disorder. But
we do not have reason to think that an amoral life must be limited to this extent nor do we
have reason think that other amoralists are all subject to some kind of mental disorder, some
kind which means that there is no need to justify morality to them.
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